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This paper presents results from a research study on charter school governance in Minnesota, the 
first state to enact charter school legislation in 1991.  The paper examines the effects of the 
political and institutional environments on charter school governance, pays particular attention to 
how charter school boards navigate their legally mandated hybrid status, and analyzes the effects 
of hybridity on governance practices and school performance. The paper makes theoretical and 
empirical contributions to our understanding of governance in strong institutional environments 




TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS:  




The critical role played by the external environment in the governance, operations, and 
sustainability of nonprofit organizations has been well established.    In the past, dominant 
features of this environment, especially regarding nonprofit governance, have revolved around 
resources and resource acquisition including funding streams, reputation and legitimacy (see, for 
example, Provan 1980; Gronbjerg 1993; and, Saidel 1991).  Less attention has been paid to how 
legal, policy and political environments have affected governance; yet, in practice, these 
environments grown increasingly important, including for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, various policy reform initiatives at the federal level, and state legal regulations (Ostrower 
& Stone 2010).    In response to some of these external changes, new types of hybrid entities 
have been created, entities that combine features of public-nonprofit and for-profit- nonprofit 
organizations (Smith 2010; Billis 2010).   
Now is an important time to bring several of these trends together, both empirically and 
theoretically, to examine the influence of different types of environments on the governance of 
hybrid nonprofits.  To do so, it is helpful to view “governance” as operating at institutional, 
inter-organizational, and organizational levels of analysis (Kooiman 1999; Stone et al, 2010) so 
that relationships among the layers can be conceptualized as well as examined.  The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the effects of the political and institutional environments on charter 
school governance in Minnesota, the first state to enact charter school legislation in 1991.  The 
paper pays particular attention to how charter school boards navigate their legally mandated 
hybrid status, and analyzes the effects of hybridity on governance practices.  Charter schools are 
public schools but must be incorporated in Minnesota as nonprofit organizations.   
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In general, the research finds that charter school governance practices differ in important 
ways from a national profile of nonprofit boards and directly reflect institutional mandates 
through their boards’ composition, activities, and perceptions of accountability.  The paper 
makes theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of governance in strong 
institutional environments and the implications of hybridity for relationships between 
contextualized governance and performance. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section includes a literature review of 
research on governance in nonprofit organizations with special attention to the influence of the 
external environment.  This section also includes research pertaining to charter school 
governance and hybrids.  The second section provides an overview of charter schools in 
Minnesota, including a brief legislative history, in order to provide the context for understanding 
connections among institutional, inter-organizational, and organizational governance features we 
examine in more detail in the study.  The third section presents the study’s methodology and the 
fourth presents study results.  The fifth section discusses these findings and generates several 
testable hypotheses.  The final section points to important future research directions. 
MULTI-LAYERED GOVERNANCE   
 
In the last two decades, the term “governance” has described many issues in the public 
and private spheres.  For example, common uses of the term include “governance not 
government” as the critical emphasis in public management (Frederickson, 1997; O’Toole, 
2000); governance as international order as in the need for global governance (Kooiman 1999); 
governance mechanisms that distinguish markets, hierarchies, and networks (Powell 1990); 
network or collaborative governance as part of the New Public Management (Goldsmith & 
Eggers 2004; Agranoff 2007); and, corporate or organizational governance.   However, while 
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definitions of governance are many, some central concepts exist (adapted from Kooiman 1999 
and Cornforth 2004):  
• Collective action and decision-making aimed at furthering overall collective 
goals; 
• Processes, structures and rules that shape and are shaped by collective actions; 
• Underlying systems of accountability to enhance legitimacy, effectiveness and/or 
efficiency. 
Scholarly attention to governance has also begun to highlight its multi-layered nature  
(Cornforth 2010; Hughes 2010; Kooiman 1999; Stone, Crosby & Bryson fc).  As the uses of the 
term governance above suggest, governance occurs at institutional, sectoral, interorganizational, 
and organizational levels of analysis.  In keeping with line of thought, we suggest that in order to 
fully understand charter school governance, one must view governance as a system that crosses 
levels and includes: institutional and political actions through legislative maneuverings and 
mandates and executive branch policymaking; interorganizational relationships between 
intermediary overseers, or authorizers, and charter schools; and organizational governance 
conducted by charter school boards of directors.   While these different levels can be studied 
separately, and in much of the charter school literature they are, our guiding premise is that the 
levels interact in significant ways and, therefore, necessitate establishing whether, where and 
how clear linkages exist among and between institutional, interorganizational, and organizational 
governing behaviors and activities.   
 In the literature on nonprofit governance, these connections have most often been 
expressed by viewing boards as an interface or boundary spanner between internal and external 
environments (Middleton 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), using resource dependence, 
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institutional theories of the environment or principal/agent theories (Miller-Millesen 2003).  For 
example, early studies focused on how the selection of certain types of board members may 
enhance the legitimacy and reputation of a nonprofit and thus its fundraising potential (Provan 
1980) and contribute to the solidification of community elites (Perucci & Pilisuk 1970).  More 
recent studies have often concentrated on the funding environment, and, more specifically, the 
extent to which government contracting influences board functions, power and composition 
(Harlan and Saidel, 1994; Grønbjerg 1993; Kramer, 1981, 1987; Saidel and Harlan, 1998; Smith 
& Lipsky, 1993; Stone, 1996).   
These kinds of interactions between boards and their external environments are 
important, but the environment of the last two decades includes far more. Government 
regulations, key legal cases, and institutional pressures for legitimacy can influence board 
composition, roles, and policies (Abzug & Galaskiewicz, 2001; Goes & Zhan,1995; Molinari et 
al, 1995; Ostrower, 2007; Weiner & Alexander, 1993).  For example, the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has had a profound impact on nonprofit board roles and policies.  
Recent studies find that environmental influences, including both state law and nonprofit funding 
streams are important for understanding variations in the adoption of accountability-related 
practices and externally oriented stewardship roles, such as fundraising and community relations 
(Ostrower and Bobowick, 2006; Ostrower, 2007; Ostrower and Stone 2010).   
 One organizational response to the increasing complexity of external environments for 
nonprofits has been a rise in number and type of hybrid forms.  Stimulated by changing 
government policies, policy implementation and funding preferences in the US and around the 
globe, hybridity is one solution to institutional pressures faced by many nonprofit organizations. 
The often-used phrase, “blurring of sectoral boundaries,” may be inadequate to explain the 
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upsurge in many types of hybrid entities and organizational forms that combine significant 
attributes of more than one sector (Billis 2010).  Hybrid entities exist along a continuum and 
include both formal and informal arrangements, for example, those under the banner of social 
enterprise or social entrepreneurship, public-private partnerships, and complex but informal 
networks (Skelcher 2011; Smith 2010). There is not a common definition of hybridity – for 
example, some emphasize hybrid characteristics of an organization’s mission (Minkoff 2002), 
the mix of resources (Borys & Jamison 1989), core structural elements (Billis 2010), or public 
and private orientations (Skelcher 2011).  Overall, however, and questions remain regarding the 
extent to which hybridity is spawning new governance practices (Smith 2010). 
 In this study, we pay attention to the needs for a multi-level and hence deeper 
conceptualization of governance, an expanded and differentiated view of the environment, and 
attention to hybrid organizational forms especially regarding their governance.  Charter schools 
provide excellent sites from which to address these trends. First, charter schools exist in complex 
political and institutional environments that have the potential to significantly affect their 
governance practices.  Charter schools provide an opportunity to research how macro-
environmental forces affect micro-organizational governance.  Second, in response to these 
politicized environments, charter schools are often established by statute as hybrids.  In many 
states, including Minnesota, charter schools are public schools and must serve all the functions of 
an independent school district but must be incorporated as nonprofit organizations. Third, little is 
known about governance practices of charter school boards and how those practices compare 
more broadly to those of other nonprofit boards.  In particular, this paper addresses the following 
research questions:  
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1. What is the profile of governance characteristics of Minnesota’s charter schools and how 
do these relationships compare with the results from the Urban Institute study (Ostrower 
2007)? 
2. Under what conditions does the relationship between a charter school and its authorizer 
affect its governance?   
3. How does the institutional environment influence charter school governance? In 
particular, how do individual charter school boards respond to legal mandates that 
incorporate both public and nonprofit (hybrid) organizational qualities?    
 In the next section, we describe in general the governance environment for charter 
schools and then look more closely at the Minnesota context.    
THE CHARTER SCHOOL GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT  
 
 At the core of the argument for charter schools, or the “horsetrade” as some term it 
(Manno et al. 2000), is the agreement that charters will be granted autonomy from bureaucratic 
regulation in exchange for results-oriented accountability.  The argument is that if charters are 
free from regulatory burden and compliance-focused accountability and are granted more 
autonomy, then accountability to parents and students for academic results will increase and will 
improve overall educational standards (Manno et al, 2000; Finnigan 2007; Shober et al. 2006).  
Those schools that demonstrate effective results will thrive while those that do not will close.  
However, the autonomy-accountability trade-off reflects value commitments that are broadly 
contested in the US political environment and go beyond the education policy domain (Shober et 
al 2006).  It should not be surprising, therefore, that the context within which charter school 
governance and financial management takes place is complex and dynamic, encompassing legal, 
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regulatory, funding, policy and political environments.  Figure 1 provides a policy fields map of 
this context for Minnesota charter schools.   
*********************** 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
*********************** 
 From this map, one can readily see that individual charter schools must deal with legal 
and regulatory mandates at both federal and state levels.  For example, charter schools must 
comply with No Child Left Behind testing and performance standards as well as those required 
in state law. In terms of governance, if incorporated as nonprofit entities, charter schools must 
comply with federal requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue Service on all tax-exempt 
entities, state nonprofit corporation law and state charter school governance law.  Until recent 
changes to the Minnesota charter school law, federal and state regulations concerning conflicts of 
interests contradicted the legal requirement that charter schools maintain teacher majority boards.   
 Funding flows are similarly complex as charter schools receive a mix of public funding 
sources from federal, state, and/or local governments as well as private sources such as 
foundation and individual donors. State allocations through per pupil reimbursements are the 
major funding source for K-12 education in Minnesota and these allocations flow from schools 
districts that in turn receive funding from the state as well as local sources.  The recent state’s 
financial crisis and political/policy decisions of the previous and current administrations 
(unallottments of state appropriations to school districts) put substantial strain on both traditional 
public schools and charter schools. Charter schools, however, face additional challenges because 
they tend not to have local revenue support, lack state funding for school capital outlays, and 
have minimal expertise in private fundraising.    
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 The political environment surrounding charter school legislation is a critical aspect of 
their context and includes many interest groups and constituencies as well as the roles of the 
governor and legislature involved in charter school issues (Vergari 2000). For example, in 
Minnesota, opposition to the original charter school legislation by the state teachers’ union 
stimulated policymakers to include the “teacher majority” provision in charter school governance 
(Reichgott Jung 2012).   The overall state political ideology also plays a role -- Bulkey’s 1999 
study found that authorizers in Arizona differed significantly from those in Michigan due largely 
to differences in the states’ political environments (Bulkey 1999).   
 In much of the academic literature, charter school governance is equated with the roles 
that authorizers play.  Authorizers are the entities legally responsible for oversight and 
accountability of charter schools and may include institutional entities such as local school 
districts or state education agencies or more independent entities such as higher education 
institutions or nonprofit organizations.  They authorize schools to operate for a certain number of 
years under a contract or “charter” regarding school mission, curriculum, student demographics, 
evaluation of academic progress, school governance, and financial management. In fact, some 
claim that, through the use of authorizers, the charter school movement itself is a “governance-
based reform” (Carlson et al., 2011): as intermediaries between public authority and 
independent, private organizations, authorizers can be viewed as a governance structure that 
attempts to resolve the principal-agent problem facing charter schools and the competing public 
values concerning accountability and autonomy.  They are often seen as a medium through 
which policy and legislatures interact with schools themselves (Bulkley 1999; Vergari 2001), or 
as Vergari (2001) states, “shaping the regulatory boundaries of a policy reform based on 
deregulation.”  Given the contested nature of autonomy/accountability trade-off, it is not 
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surprising that considerable variation exists regarding the policy environments in which 
authorizers operate, including the types of authorizers permitted by each state.    
 Within these contexts, various types of authorizing entities have received significant 
attention. The literature breaks the various types of authorizing entities into ‘traditional’ and 
‘alternative.’ Traditional authorizing entities are authorizers that are located within the 
institutional structures of public school governance, primarily local school districts and state 
education agencies or SEAs and, more infrequently, municipalities and county/regional boards.  
While local school districts are the most common authorizers, they are often seen as one of the 
least effective due to their lack of resources and the politicized environments in which they 
operate (Palmer & Gau, 2005; Palmer, 2007).  Some also claim that they offer the least 
independence for charter schools, missing a necessary element for overall systemic reform 
(Carlson et al. 2011).  Alternative authorizers mainly include separate state-level charter boards, 
higher education institutions, and nonprofit organizations. While these entities are often larger 
and better insulated from politics, their ability to serve as good authorizers is highly dependent 
on state charter law and policy as well as the nature of the authorizer itself (Palmer, 2007). For 
example, a recent 10-year panel study of authorizers and student performance in Minnesota 
(Carlson et al. 2011) found that there was no statistically significant relationship between charter 
school authorizing type and achievement, although nonprofit authorizers were related to more 
variability of results than local school districts.   
 At the level of the individual charter school, research on their governance is nearly 
nonexistent.  One chapter in a report, based on a study conducted between 2006-2009 that 
included a survey of 400 charter school leaders and interviews in 24 charter schools addresses 
governance challenges facing schools (Campbell 2009).  Its principle finding is that charter 
12 
 
boards, while critical to the overall charter school reform movement, are underutilized, 
especially with regard to more strategic-oriented issues.  Other materials on charter school 
governance are oriented toward practitioners and often look strikingly similar to those developed 
for nonprofit boards more generally (see, for example, Carpenter 2011; Cornell-Feist nd).   
History of Charter Schools in Minnesota 
 Ideas about open enrollment and school choice, new accountabilities focused on results, 
and the need for broad reform of the nation’s (and Minnesota’s) public education system came 
together in 1989 when the first chartered schools (then called “outcomes-based schools”) 
legislation was proposed in Minnesota.   By the time this groundbreaking legislation was signed 
into law in 1991, stiff opposition from the state’s teachers unions, some members of both parties, 
and local school officials had whittled down these big ideas into a much smaller innovation: the 
number of charter schools was capped at eight; only licensed teachers could form and operate 
charter schools and they must comprise a majority on charter school boards; and, a new school 
must be “authorized” or gain the approval of both the local school district and the MN State 
Board of Education.  Despite these significant compromises, Minnesota’s charter law laid the 
groundwork nationally for broader interest and legislation.  Presidential candidate Bill Clinton 
made charter schools a centerpiece of his campaign and later his administration, and California 
passed charter school legislation in 1992.  Eventually in Minnesota, the cap on the number of 
charter schools was eliminated and the range of authorizers (then called “sponsors”) was 
broadened to include colleges, universities and nonprofit organizations.   
 Significant revisions to Minnesota’s charter school law occurred in 2009 after a series of 
widely publicized school scandals and two critical reports by the Office of the Legislative 
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Auditor (OLA)1 in five years.  Revisions primarily concerned the governance and financial 
management practices of charter schools themselves and the roles and responsibilities of 
authorizers. For charter school boards, the teacher majority mandate was lifted but in its place, 
schools were required to have at least one teacher, parent, and community representative as 
board members.  Board members were mandated to undergo Department approved board 
training focused on financial management and oversight practices.  In terms of authorizers, the 
2009 revisions were substantial.  According to interviewees in Minnesota, charter school law and 
policy had, until 2009, emphasized more of a hands-off role for authorizers with few regulations 
or guidelines related to authorizer roles and responsibilities. In response to growing 
accountability problems within charter schools, the 2009 legislative changes emphasized 
authorizers as the primary intermediary bodies (between the state and the schools themselves) 
responsible for oversight of charters.  The new legislation mandated that authorizers oversee all 
financial, operational, and student performance activities of their charter schools and receive 
annually from the schools a report that details student enrollment and performance data, 
governance, staffing, operational, and financial management practices, and future plans. Changes 
to the law also tightened up the processes by which authorizers would be approved and overseen 
by the state Department of Education. 
 The history of charter schools legislation in Minnesota2 illustrates many tensions 
embedded in current institutional and political environments over public v. private approaches to 
solving public problems. From the beginning, the idea of chartered schools was one that 
                                                
1 Office of the Legislative Auditor (2008) Evaluation Report: Charter Schools. 
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/charterschools.pdf 
Office of the Legislative Auditor (2003) Evaluation Report: Charter School Financial Accountability. 
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/0306all.pdf 
2 This historical summary is drawn from Ember Reichgott Junge, 2012, Zero Chance of Passage: The Pioneering 
Charter School Story, draft manuscript and  Joe Nathan, 1995, Charter Public Schools: A Brief History and 
Preliminary Lessons, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota: Center for School Change as 
well as interviews with several key informants. 
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challenged much of the prevailing institutional environment of public education, including the 
teachers’ unions, local school boards, and superintendents because its focus was on systems 
change from within public educational institutions.3   The idea of chartering emphasized the 
ability to innovate and be accountable in new ways.  Ember Reichgott Junge, the state senator 
who proposed the initial charter legislation, saw charter schools as “R & D labs” within public 
education where teachers and parents could innovate and be autonomous from existing public 
school bureaucracies. They would be new public schools, in the words of Joe Nathan who 
formed the Center for School Change in 1988 at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Public 
accountability of these schools, as proposed by Ted Kolderie and co-authors of a 1988 Citizens 
League report, would be different because accountability would focus on school outcomes rather 
than compliance with bureaucratic rules.  Teachers in particular would have both the freedom 
and the responsibility of designing educational programs that would deliver results in terms of 
student performance.  On the other side of the debate, however, teachers’ unions, some members 
of both the DFL4 and Republican parties, and local school districts saw charter schools as 
undercutting funding to traditional public schools, thus placing teachers’ jobs at risk. Some 
claimed that public dollars would go to these “private,” charter schools, and they closely aligned 
charter school initiatives with the school choice and voucher movements that advocated public 
education dollars follow students who chose private, parochial, or alternative schools.   These 
were false claims as Minnesota charter school proposals were always for public not private 
charter schools. In the end, and as a result of hotly contested debates about the autonomy and 
                                                
3 Ironically, this idea of an independent public school cut loose from myriad educational requirements and 
regulations, came from Al Shanker, then head of the American Federation of Teachers, the powerful national 
teachers’ union. 
4 Minnesota’s Democratic Party composed of a historical coalition of Democrats-Farmers-Labor constituencies. 
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accountability aspects of charter schools, legislation in Minnesota emphasizes both the public 
and nonprofit, independent aspects of charter schools.   
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The research study employed a mixed methods research design.  Components included 
case studies of four charter schools and a governance survey of the population of MN charter 
schools.  The cases included schools with different types of authorizers and different mission 
foci.  Interviews were conducted with the school leader and members of the board, including 
parent, teacher, and community representatives.  Data from these interviews were entered into 
NVivo 9.0, a qualitative analysis software program, and coded according to major question 
categories, school, and interviewee roles.  
The governance survey was administered to all MN charter schools (N=150) via their 
school leaders through an online survey mechanism.5 The overall response rate for the survey 
was 50% of the population of MN charter schools, and an analysis of respondent bias determined 
that these respondents were very similar to the population overall of charter schools in terms of 
geographic location, size, and age. The survey asked basic information about board size, 
composition, meeting frequency and so forth but also asked school leaders to assess board 
recruitment issues as well as board activity levels in a variety of common board roles.6  
 In conducting the initial analysis of survey data, we did a basic profile of all survey 
respondents and then broke responses down by authorizer type, school mission, school age and 
student enrollments (a proxy for “size”).  Authorizer types included nonprofit, higher education, 
                                                
5 Survey available from the authors. 
6 Parts of the survey replicated the national, representative survey of nonprofit boards conducted by the Urban 
Institute in 2005.6  By replicating the Urban Institute survey, we are able to compare various facets of MN charter 




MN Department of Education, and local school district authorizers.7 For school mission, we 
relied on a 2009 report on New York City charter schools8 that categorized schools’ missions as 
follows: child-centered, traditional/general, rigorous academic, targeted student demographic, 
and targeted curriculum.   
FINDINGS 
 
 In this section, the paper first presents a summary of the profile of charter school boards 
in Minnesota drawn primarily from survey of all charter boards and interview data.  Following 
this subsection, the paper compares this profile of Minnesota charter school boards with findings 
from the Urban Institute governance survey.  The final subsection presents the results relative to 
the influence of the institutional and political environment on charter school board governance 
which may help explain some of the differences between charter school boards and nonprofit 
boards more generally.   
Profile of Charter School Governance Characteristics and Practices 
 This subsection presents data on board composition, structure, recruitment, board 
activities, and perceptions of accountabilities from survey respondents and interviewees.  Each 
subsection also includes discussion of any substantial differences that appear by authorizer type, 
mission, school age, and student enrollments. Data from the four mini-case studies are included 
where appropriate. 
 Board Composition and Recruitment.  In general, charter school boards are small (5-9 
members) and composed of relatively young (under 50 years of age), white, female members. 
                                                
7 We did not code for “sole purpose” authorizers because these are new authorizer types that only began in 2011-
2012. 
8 Hoxby, Caroline M, Jenny Lee Kang, and Sonali Murarka. 2009. “Technical Report: How New York City Charter 
Schools Affect Achievement.”  
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The largest group on boards is teachers (42%), most of whom are employed by the charter 
school.  Board member expertise is primarily in education (60%).    
*********************** 
Insert Charts 1 and 2 Here 
*********************** 
 Meeting the statutory requirements for board composition is most difficult when it comes 
to recruiting community representatives where 69% say it is somewhat or very difficult.  It is 
somewhat less difficult to recruit parents (62% say it is somewhat or very difficult), and it is not 
difficult to recruit teachers.  When recruiting, executive directors report that knowledge of the 
school’s mission and willingness to give time are the most important criteria (73% and 70% 
respectively); recruiting for racial and ethnic diversity and ability to fundraise or donate are not 
important (only 9% and 3% respectively report these are very important criteria). 
 There do not appear to be significant differences in these composition characteristics 
among schools based on their type of authorizer.  School age and student enrollment do show 
some significant differences where older schools are positively related to larger board size and 
more members with an educational background.  Older schools are negatively related to having 
board members with a management or financial background and percentage of community 
representatives.  Schools with larger enrollments are also associated with larger boards.  
Some significant differences (p < .05 or better) appear when schools are categorized by 
their missions.  For example, those that targeted a specific student demographic (such as an 
ethnic or racial group), had a significantly higher percentage of Hispanics and community 
representatives on their boards than did schools with a rigorous academic mission, and a 
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significantly higher percentage of African Americans on their boards than did schools with a 
student-centered curriculum.   
 Board Structure and Activities.  Boards are most active in internal functions, including 
financial oversight (87% report very active), setting policy (83%), planning for the future (73%) 
and evaluating the executive director (69%). They are not very active in common external 
functions of the board, including fundraising (11% report their boards are very active), 
influencing public policy (8%) or community outreach (11%).  In line with these findings, 
executive directors report that the top two priorities for their boards are financial oversight and 
planning for future (86% and 44% respectively); the bottom two priorities are fundraising and 
community outreach (0% and 5% respectively).   
********************** 
Insert Chart 3 Here 
********************** 
 Boards have committed members (95% of all board members attend at least three-
quarters of all board meetings) who are focused on the mission of the school, financial 
management and setting policy.  Schools leaders report that their schools review their missions 
annually (69%) and most have active Finance Committees (86%) while far fewer have active 
committees for human resources (34%) or fundraising and development (29%).   
 Almost all boards exclude the school’s executive director from being a voting member of 
the board (98.5%) and have a written conflict of interest policy (97%).  However, interviewees 
expressed concerns over the extent to which board members, especially parents and teachers, 
face challenges over their roles in “representing” constituencies versus governing for the good of 
the whole school. Parents may run for election because of a passionate interest in a single issue 
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and teachers encounter inherent conflicts when dealing with certain board topics such as salary 
and benefits, scheduling, and curriculum issues.  
 Few differences in board activity level were found when schools were broken down by 
authorizer type, mission focus, school age and enrollment size.   
 Accountability.  Overall, accountability reflects attention to formal authority where, when 
asked to choose two groups to whom their boards and they feel most accountable, EDs report 
that their boards feel most accountable to authorizers (56%) and executive directors feel most 
accountable to their boards (67%).  At the bottom of both lists (under 20%) were the public at 
large, taxpayers, MDE, and teachers.   
 No substantial differences exist among categories of charter schools regarding most 
questions of accountability.  There is a negative relationship between larger schools and 
accountability the school leader feels toward the authorizer but it is barely at a statistical level of 
significance.  Among older schools, school leaders also feel less accountable to taxpayers and the 
public at larger.  
 Public v. Private Dollars.  73% of all survey respondents reported that their school’s 
annual revenues relied on 5% or less of dollars raised from private or philanthropic sources. 
 Relationship between Governance and Student Performance and School Sustainability. 
Data for this category come from interviews with school leaders and board members of four 
charter schools.9  Overall, interviewees did not believe that board governance directly affected 
school performance.  More important influencers of student performance included the home 
environment and parents, teachers and school leader.  In one school, interviewees also spoke 
about student relationships within the school.  Interviewees felt that if the board had a role in 
student performance, it was through hiring the right ED.  Some felt that they appreciated another 
                                                
9 The next phase of this study will link student performance data for each school to the survey data base. 
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perspective on their work – as one stated, “nice to have an outside perspective.”  Interviewees 
did think board governance was important to the overall sustainability of the school, especially in 
terms of financial soundness and stability.  
Comparison of MN charter school board characteristics with Urban Institute national sample 
of nonprofit boards 
 Table 1 provides a detailed summary of our data on Minnesota charter schools when 
compared with the Urban Institute’s data on its national survey of nonprofit organizations.  In 
general, Minnesota’s charter school boards differ substantially from many US nonprofits: they 
are smaller boards, composed of younger and more female members, have less business 
expertise among board membership, are far less active in terms of fundraising, and demonstrate 
more accountability (for example, by having a written conflict of interest policy, and excluding 
the ED from being a voting board member).  They are similar to the national sample in terms of 
being predominantly white, non-Hispanic and emphasizing internal governance activities over 
more externally focused activities. 
************************** 
Insert Table 1 Here 
************************** 
Effects of authorizer type on charter school board characteristics 
 As can be seen from the date presented above, the type of authorizer (including school 
district, state Department of Education, institutions of higher education, and nonprofit 
organizations) did not have a significant effect on any board characteristics.  Interviewees 
consistently stated that their authorizers were helpful resources when governance problems arose 
but removed themselves from any direct involvement in governance.  Authorizers were seen as 
21 
 
part of a larger compliance system and may, therefore, have had more indirect effects on 
particular aspects of charter school governance, such as board attention to financial and student 
performance oversight activities.  
Effects of the institutional environment on charter school governance 
 As stated earlier, while Minnesota’s charter schools must be organized as nonprofit 
entities under 501©3 of the Internal Revenue Service code, they are also designated as “public 
schools” and part of the state’s public education system.  Furthermore, they must serve all of the 
functions of independent school districts among others. As such, they must comply with a host of 
regulations not faced by the state’s other nonprofit corporations, including a designation of 
electors of the board, specific board composition requirements, mandatory state board training, 
an inability to charge tuition, and a mandate to comply with the state’s Open Meeting  Law, 
fulfilling school district administration and reporting requirements, providing extracurricular 
activities, and bussing (see Table 2).   
************************** 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
************************** 
 The tensions these mixed statutory requirements place on the boards of charter schools 
was expressed through survey responses and several themes in the case study interviews.   
 Board composition – Recruitment in general: Interviewees reported that meeting some 
board composition requirements was difficult, especially when boards tried to recruit for the 
community representative position.  As one board chair reported,  
[The] community member is hardest to recruit.  Parents and teachers are really 
passionate.  The challenges are that they have to run for elections (and they don’t 
want to compete); it is hard to sell them because people are so passionate, so it’s a 
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‘high drama’ board to be on; and open meeting law makes it hard to make 
decisions outside of board meetings. 
  
This dilemma was verified in the survey where 68% of all respondents reported that it was 
somewhat or very difficult to recruit a community representative to their boards.  Interviewees 
also reported that it was difficult to recruit people who were not directly related in some way to 
school staff, students, alumni, or current board members.   
 Board composition – Recruiting for expertise:  Findings from the survey and case studies 
indicate a lack of non-charter school experience and skills on their boards due, at least in part, to 
difficulties recruiting people to fulfill the legally designated roles.  Survey findings show that the 
vast preponderance of board members are employed in their charter schools (more than 40%) 
while far few are employed by business (30%).  This is in sharp contrast to national data where 
55% of nonprofit board members are employed by business. Several schools reported that they 
were now trying to recruit more broadly for non-education-related expertise but that it was 
difficult.  As one interviewee reported, “we get a lot of folks who are passionate about a single 
issue.”  Another from the same school said, “The challenge is finding the right kind of expertise, 
so not just a parent.” 
  Board Composition – Role conflicts:  Interviewees expressed concerns over the extent to 
which board members, especially parents and teachers, face challenges over their roles in 
“representing” constituencies versus governing for the good of the whole school. As expressed in 
the quotation above, parents may run for election because of a passionate interest in a single 
issue.  Some teachers on the board, even with the elimination of a teacher majority mandate, 
reported that they encounter inherent conflicts when dealing with certain board topics such as 
salary and benefits, class scheduling and class size, and some curriculum issues.   For example, 
one teacher representative stated in an interview that there is tension between whether “teachers 
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[on the board] represent the teachers or, as a board member, may have to vote ‘for the good of 
the school’” and against teacher wishes. She went to state that she has “figured out how to 
compartmentalize” between her teacher and board role.  Another teacher on a board underscored 
the need to separate out these roles.   
[I] never felt challenged by conflict between being an employee and board 
member.  I don’t let my emotions guide my decisions.  I may come across as cold 
and impersonal.  How [is a decision going to ] affect everyone else in the 
building?  Teachers? Children? Parents? Other staff? Community? Is it going to 
be better for the whole?    
 
Some also said that it was difficult to be the school leader’s “boss” during a board meeting and 
then be his or her employee the next morning at school.  As one teacher representative reported,  
 [Once] there was a problem with one [teacher on the board].  She was concerned 
with how she would be perceived by other teachers for the decisions she made as 
a board member and fear of reprisal by administrations.  That fear wasn’t 
grounded but can be hard to be a supervisor during the day but not at the board. 
 
 Open Meeting Law: A few interviewees spoke about difficulties complying with the 
Open Meeting Law.  Interviewees from two charter schools gave examples of parents organizing 
protests at board meetings to oppose specific curriculum issues and another spoke of difficulties 
holding open meetings when discussing sensitive personnel issues not covered under the law’s 
executive session parameters. As one board chair stated, board meetings become a “private 
meeting in a public space.” 
 Fundraising:  Fundraising by their boards of directors is not a current priority for charter 
schools.  School leaders report that they do not recruit for this expertise (only 3 % say that it is 
an important recruitment criterion) and that their boards are not active in this arena (0% say it is 
one of their top two priorities).  Additionally, private dollars account for less than five percent of 
revenues for 87% of the charter schools, again as reported by their school leaders.  However, 
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interviewees suggested that, because of recent substantial state holdbacks of revenues, they may 
need to increase both their board’s fundraising expertise and activities.  
DISCUSSION  
 
In this section, we return to our three central research questions to present initial 
conclusions from both the interview and survey data on charter school governance in Minnesota.   
 The first research question addressed the basic profile of charter school boards in 
Minnesota and asked how this profile compared with the Urban Institute’s national, 
representative survey of nonprofit boards.  Charter school boards in Minnesota are small, 
relatively homogeneous boards, especially regarding age, gender, race, and professional 
background.  They are largely insider boards that report having the most difficulty recruiting 
outsiders, including community representatives and even parents.  When compared to their 
national counterparts, they are smaller, younger, have more female members and less business 
expertise but are not more racially diverse.  They are far less active in terms of fundraising but 
are similar to the national profile in their emphasis on internal governance activities over more 
externally focused activities.  The boards of charter school more frequently maintain more 
accountability-related policies related to conflicts of interest and the CEO being a voting member 
of the board.   
 Regarding the second question on the effects of different types of authorizers on board 
characteristics, our research suggests that these are not associated with substantially different 
governance practices at the school level.10 As described earlier, much of the prevailing literature 
                                                
10 Our analysis of authorizer influence on board characteristics and activities is only an initial analysis and warrants 
some deeper analysis.  For example, the types of authorizers included in the category “nonprofit authorizers” are 
quite varied and include many different kinds of nonprofits.  Furthermore, there is an increasing number of sole 
purpose authorizers that were not included in this survey and it is possible that these types of authorizers are 




on charter school governance equates “governance” with the roles and practices of different 
types of authorizers.  Our research took a different approach by examining more directly 
authorizer influence on school-level governance.  While direct effects of authorizer type on 
school governance are absent in our study, the roles of authorizers as part of the broader 
regulatory (and institutional) environment do seem to be important as described below.   
 One answer to the question concerning the influence of the institutional environment on 
school-level governance is that these are very accountable boards (more so than the national 
average).  They are especially accountable “upward” to meeting the demands of their 
institutional environments, in terms of having a written conflict of interest policy, emphasizing 
financial management activities, and feeling accountable primarily to authorizers.  They 
demonstrate far less “outward” accountability to the public at large and communities beyond the 
school.  They are not actively engaged in community outreach and that is not a priority.  Most 
are not actively engaged in fundraising and when recruiting, do not put an emphasis on 
fundraising ability, business connections, or racial/ethnic diversity.  When asked how they 
defined “community,” most interviewees said their communities included teachers, parents, and 
students.   Important differences may exist, however, if charter schools are broken down by their 
types of mission where the boards of charters whose mission target a particular student 
demographic generally have higher percentages of people of color and representatives from their 
communities.    
 What this set of findings suggest is most charter school boards are engaged in a kind of 
“compliance-based” governance that is focused on successfully meeting state and authorizer 
requirements for financial oversight.  While survey respondents also indicate that “planning for 
the future” is a common board activity, it is not clear what this means in practice because few 
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interviewees mentioned long-range or strategic planning activities.  This deserves further 
investigation because, on the surface, it appears that Minnesota charter school boards practice 
neither strategic nor generative governance (Chait, Ryan, Taylor 2005).  An important question 
is whether governance practices focused on compliance with regulatory and legal mandates 
drives out practices that include long-range, school planning activities and/or activities that focus 
on big, new, and innovative ideas for meeting a school’s mission.  
CONCLUSIONS: PROPOSITIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 We have amassed a rich set of data that combines survey and interview data on 
governance. The pilot study focused on understanding the current state of Minnesota charter 
school governance and determining what relationships, if any, existed between governance and 
authorizers and the institutional environment surrounding charter schools.   In this section, we 
pose initial propositions to guide additional research. We understand that not only is this study a 
pilot research project but is also situated in the somewhat unique context of Minnesota.  We 
propose the following in light of an overall need to conduct a national, comparative study. 
 Proposition 1:  Legal mandates and policy requirements of the institutional environment 
are likely to stimulate compliance-based governance practices and may drive out strategically-
oriented practices as well as attention to educational innovation.   
 Much of the survey data point to a narrow band of board activity (financial oversight) and 
suggest strongly that boards fulfill this responsibility with members who, while meeting 
legislative mandates, have little experience or training (and, perhaps little interest) in such 
matters.  By complying with these mandates, charter schools are missing opportunities to 
develop far more diverse boards in terms of demographic characteristics and professional 
backgrounds.  They are also missing opportunities to develop diverse boards that could enhance 
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their schools’ innovation and experimentation, two of the original founding claims for charter 
schools.  Furthermore, to the extent that charter boards are composed of teachers at the school, 
schools may be adding to the already considerable educational responsibilities of these teachers 
and creating unnecessary role conflicts/conflicts of interest.  An exception to this statement may 
be schools that are intentionally created as teacher co-operatives or teacher partnerships which 
offer an alternative model of charter school governance. 
 What is unclear from our data is just how charter schools are “planning for the future” 
and whether their boards are actually engaged in some strategic thinking and acting, innovating 
and experimentation.  For example, several interviewees mentioned the need to begin to do 
substantial fundraising because of the devastating consequences of state holdbacks over the past 
several years.  Some were considering a broader board recruitment effort focused on attracting 
people with fundraising expertise.  Recruiting a new kind of board member and beginning to 
tackle fundraising as a serious activity could easily lead to much deeper thinking about long-
range plans and innovations in programming.  Future research needs to examine these kinds of 
evolving roles for charter school boards. 
 Proposition 2:  Differences in charter school governance characteristics are more likely 
associated with differences in school mission than differences in authorizer types. 
 Based on interview data, schools seem to select authorizers based on fairly expedient 
criteria and perceive authorizers as playing primarily oversight and enforcement roles.  Charter 
school missions, on the other hand, are an expression of the “private” nature of charter schools 
because schools are free to design their individual missions and enact this mission through a 
variety of practices related to educational and curriculum programming, staffing selections, and 
perhaps governance.  As reported above, there are some significant differences in board 
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composition based on differences in charter missions especially among schools whose missions 
target particular student demographics, have student-centered, or rigorous academic missions.  
Future research should highlight the role of charter school missions in each of these areas of 
practice.  In particular, future research should examine whether and how charter boards resolve 
conflicts and tensions between legal mandates concerning governance and mission-related 
imperatives.   
 A corollary to Proposition 2 is the possibility that some missions are aligned (either 
intentionally or unintentionally) with distinct models of governance.  This may be most clearly 
seen in schools with student-centered curriculums who also maintain a teacher co-operative 
model or quasi-cooperative model form of governance.  Further statistical analysis could point 
toward whether such distinct models exist among Minnesota charter schools. 
 Proposition 3.  There may be important, although indirect, relationships between 
governance characteristics and student performance.   
 Analyzing relationships between governance characteristics and various measures of 
student performance was beyond the scope of this pilot study.  However, based on interview 
data, most board members and school leaders do not believe that their boards play an important 
role in overall student achievement.  It could be argued that their emphasis on financial oversight 
plays an indirect role in performance because a stable financial situation keeps the school 
focused on its educational mission and not mired in financial troubles.  However, there are two 
problematic aspects to this argument.  First, charter school boards are not recruiting for 
fundraising expertise or even for people with extensive external networks of resources.  These 
are insider boards that are tightly connected to a school’s very proximate community of teachers-
parents-students.  Additionally, a narrow focus on financial oversight may detract from a 
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school’s ability to develop innovative programming that improves student achievement.  
Examining this proposition should be a major thrust of a follow-up research project.  While 
several types of student performance data are publicly available, there are significant problems 
associated with these data.   
 To conclude, this research study finds evidence of substantive effects of political and 
institutional environments on Minnesota’s charter school governance.  The political environment 
includes long-lasting and strong opposition to these educational reform initiatives, while the 
institutional environment of laws and regulations reflect compromises made in the context of 
legislative debate.  For Minnesota charter schools, “hybridity” of form was a political solution to 
some of these debates.  The legal and policy mandates that charter schools were historically 
charged with meeting (e.g., teacher majority boards) and those they are currently required to 
fulfill (e.g., nonprofit-public school hybrid, Open Meeting Laws, board composition mandates) 
were created, in theory, with the intention of strengthening school-level governance capacity.  
However, the challenges faced by Minnesota charters as well as their boards’ profile have 
demonstrated that these policies and the charters’ hybrid organization form have, in practice, 
weakened their ability to deliver on their hallmark promises of local governance and innovation.  
Thus, while the hybrid public-nonprofit form characterizing charter schools was well-
intentioned, the reality of its implementation has lead, in many cases, to weakened school-level 
governance capacity.  It remains to be seen whether this conclusion holds in other states where 
the political and policy debates around charter schools have yielded different solutions and 
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Table 1.  MN Charter School Profile Compared with Urban Institute’s Nation Survey of Nonprofit Organizations 
 
Board Characteristic MN Charter School Board Data Urban Institute Nonprofit Board Data11 
   
Composition    
• Size 82% have between 5-9 members 
 
Average size is 13 members 
• Age 83% under age of 50 44% under age of 50 
• Gender 61% female 46% female12 
• Race/ethnicity 86% white (non-Hispanic) 86% white (non-Hispanic)13 
• Employment background 43% employed by “this charter school” 
20% work for business 
3% work for “this nonprofit” 
55% work for business 
• CEO as voting board member? No – 98.5% No – 67% 
Yes – 33% 
   
Recruitment Criteria   
• Most important criteria Knowledge of mission (73%) 
Willingness to give time (70%) 
?? 
?? 
• Least important criteria Racial diversity (9%) 
Ability to fundraise, donate (3%) 
Business connections (5%) 
Friend of current board member (0%) 




Difficulty recruiting(% “Very” difficult)   
• In general 17%  20% very difficult  
• Teachers 8%  NA14 
• Parents 14%  NA 
• Community representatives 31% NA 
                                                
11 Ostrower, F. 2007. “Nonprofit Governance in the US: Findings on the Performance and Accountability from the First National Representative Study.” 
Washington, DC: Urban Institute; Ostrower, F. 2008. “Boards of Midsize Nonprofits: Their Needs and Challenges.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
12 Smaller nonprofits have more women 
13 Smaller nonprofits are less diverse 
14 NA means question was not asked in UI survey 
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Board Structure   
• COI policy? Yes – 97% Yes – 50% 
No – 50% 
• Board committees Most active: Finance 
Others <40% active 
Fundraising/Development 29% active 
No comparable data 
• Agenda setting  70% board chair 
85% CEO/ED 
30% other board members15 
• Meeting attendance 95% attend at least three-quarters of all 
board meetings per year 
77% average attendance16 
• Term limits No term limits – 80%  
   
Board Activities (% very active/% “top two 
priorities” 
  
• Financial oversight 87%/86% 52% 
• Setting policy 83%/44% 52% 
• Planning for the future 73% 44% 
• Evaluating executive director 67% 54%17 
• Sounding board for management 37% ~30% 
• Monitoring programs 33% 32% 
• Evaluating the board itself 32% 17% 
• Academic oversight 32% NA 
• Board recruitment 21% NA 
• Fundraising 11% 29% 
• Community outreach 11% 27% 
• Influencing public policy 8% 10% 
                                                
15 All for midsize nonprofits 
16 For those nonprofits that do not compensate board members 








Board Performance of activities [ED 
ratings] (% good or excellent) 
  
• Financial oversight 94% 82% 
• Setting policy 81% 79% 
• Planning for the future 83% 70%   
• Evaluating executive director 78% 74%18 
• Sounding board for management 73% ?? 
• Monitoring programs 73% 71% 
• Evaluating the board itself 45% ?? 
• Academic oversight 78% NA 
• Board recruitment 58% NA 
• Fundraising 16% 49%  
• Community outreach 38% 64%  
• Influencing public policy 22% ?? 
   
Mission Review   
• How frequent? 69% review mission annually ?? 
   
Accountability   
• Top 2 [ED perception of board 
accountability] 
56% - authorizer 
44% - parents 
NA 
• Top 2 [ED report of ED 
accountability] 
67% - board 
36% - students 
34% - authorizer 
NA 
   
Revenues   
                                                
18 See FN 6 
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• % from private sources (not 
government) 







Table 2.  Summary of Charter School Hybrid Features in MN Statutes (2011) 
 
Statutory Reference and Language Public Nonprofit 
124D.10, Subd. 4. Formation of School (a): How 
organized 
 Must be organized as a nonprofit corporate  
 
124D.10, Subd. 4. Formation of school (b): 
Chartered by an authorizer 
Before operators can establish and operate a school, they 
must have an authorizer who then files a petition with the 
MDE for approval 
 




Electors of board must consist of employed staff members 
and all parents or legal guardians 
 
 
124D.10, Subd. 4. Formation of School (d): Open 
meeting law 
 




124D.10, Subd. 4. Formation of School (f): 
Mandatory board training 
Every charter school board member must attend 
department (MDE) approved ongoing training 
 
 
124D.10, Subd. 4. Formation of School (g):  Board 
composition 
At least 5 members and include at least one licensed, 
employed teacher, one parent of current student, and one 
community member not employed and not a parent of an 
enrolled child 
 
Board may be teacher majority 
 
Charter school employees shall not serve on the 
board (unless as a teacher representative); CFO 
and CAO are ex officio. 
124D.10, Subd. 7. Public status: exemption from 
statutes and rules (a):   
Charter school is a public school and is part of the state’s 
system of public education. 
 
Is exempt from all statutes and rules applicable to school, 




124D.10, Subd. 7. Public status: exemption from 
statutes and rules (g):  tuition  
 




124D.10, Subd. 7. Public status: exemption from 
statutes and rules (j):   




124D.10, Subd. 9 (3): Admission requirements: 
enrollments 
Must enroll every student who applies if there is room and 
cannot limit admission to intellectual ability, achievement, 
athletic ability, etc. 
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